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INTRODUCTION
Rats and cockroaches scurry.' A single low wattage bulb hanging
from the ceiling provides the only light-when it works and the
electricity is on.2 A small, wooden bed with no mattress or bedding,
one of two running the length of the cell, blocks the only source of
ventilation: a small window with no glass.' The common bathroom
has no running water.4 The toilets have no seats and are filled to the
I. Written Testimony of Krista Barnes and Jennifer Davis before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States I
(Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with authors); Written Testimony of Claire Davis before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American
States 2 (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file with authors). See 143 CONG. REC. H3685, H3686
(daily ed. June 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ewing) (arguing for a sense-of-the-
Congress amendment to a foreign affairs bill then under consideration by the
United States House of Representatives). "The prison where they are being held is
not fit for humans. It was built for 230 but has about 700 prisoners, including small
children. The women share a communal bathroom no running water and no soap.
The food is unsanitary and they do not receive any milk, vegetables, or fruit. Dis-
ease is rampant as well as rats, roaches, and sick animals. Health care is virtually
nonexistent and Jennifer has lost over 22 pounds." Id. The conditions described in
this introduction are those of two United States teen-aged girls who were incarcer-
ated in the Republic of Peru. In an effort to liberate them from this health endan-
gering environment and from incarceration conditions that violate international
human rights standards, their families, friends and attorneys, including the authors
of this article, appealed to the United States Congress and to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, an organ of the Organization of American States.
Much of the factual predicate of this article is derived from these efforts.
2. Comp. at 8, Case 11.866, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Dec. 10, 1997).
3. Written Testimony of Krista Barnes and Jennifer Davis before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States I
(Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with authors); Written Testimony of Claire Davis before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American
States 2 (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file with authors).
4. 143 CONG. REc. S5667 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dur-
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rim with bodily waste! The only food that the prison provides con-
tains rat meat and cockroach carcasses.' There is no drinking 
water.I
If one complains of a toothache, a dentist, who does not care enough
to wear gloves for his own protection, pulls the tooth.' Break your
leg and a doctor will try to amputate it.
These are a few of the conditions that Jennifer Davis and Krista
Barnes, two American teenage girls, endured for nearly three years in
a Peruvian prison. On September 25, 1996, Peruvian police appre-
hended Davis and Barnes, citizens of the United States, at the Lima
airport for attempting to transport several kilos of pure cocaine to the
United States. '° Immediately upon their arrest, the two young women
bin)
The physical conditions under which Jennifer and Krista are being held are
in violation of the basic spirit and letter of international human rights
agreements, to which Peru is a signatory. I have spoken to their parents.
The prison where they are being held is extremely overcrowded. Basic
health care is not provided. Nourishment is inadequate. There is sexual and
other violence taking place. The shared bathroom facilities have no running
water and are extremely filthy and disease is rampant.
Id. See 143 CONG. REC. H3685 (daily ed. June 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ew-
ing) (describing these same squalid conditions to members of the House of Repre-
sentatives).
5. See Written Testimony of Melissa Davis before the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States 1 (Jan. 26, 1998)
(on file with authors). See also, 143 CONG. REC. S5667 (daily ed. June 16, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Durbin) (describing the bathroom as "extremely filthy").
6. See Written Testimony of Debra Browning before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States 1 (Feb. 15,
1998) (on file with authors). See also, 143 CONG. REC. S5667 (daily ed. June 16,
1997) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (reporting that "nourishment is inadequate"); 143
CONG. REc. H3686 (daily ed. June 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ewing) (relating
that "the food is unsanitary").
7. See Written Testimony of Krista Barnes and Jennifer Davis before the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States
1 (Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with authors).
8. See id. at2.
9. See Written Testimony of Tina Marie Myers before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States 1 (Feb. 1,
1998) (on file with authors).
10. See 143 CONG. REc. S5667 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Durbin); 143 CONG. REC. H3686 (daily ed. June I1, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Ewing) (describing the factual background of the situation).
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confessed their guilt as best they could without the benefit of a
translator or an attorney." For the next two years, they cooperated
with authorities to name and identify the Peruvian operatives who
masterminded the smuggling scheme. They also testified repeatedly
against those who had been captured because of their assistance.'2
The Peruvian Government, in turn, rewarded Davis and Barnes for
their help by locking them up in Chorrillos, a women's prison out-
side of Lima, where they were exposed daily to inhumane and dan-
gerous conditions. In so doing, Peru violated its own laws and its
commitment to several international human rights instruments, to
which Peru is a voluntary party. 3 Peru compounded that problem by
withholding from the two teenagers basic due process rights to a
speedy charge, trial, sentence, and appeal, all in violation of domestic
laws and international human rights standards.
Peru is a party to regional and universal human rights covenants
that require observance of minimum due process standards. How-
ever, for two and one half years after their arrest, confession, and co-
operation with police investigators and prosecutors, Davis and
Barnes remained incarcerated without a final sentence.1 4 For the first
year and half, the Republic of Peru refused to formally charge them
despite their uncontested confessions made in the first hours of their
detention." Finally, on February 11, 1998, only after Davis and
Barnes filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on





15. See 143 CONG. REC. H7715-08 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Ewing).
16. See Comp. at 8, Case 11.866, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Dec. 10, 1997). The com-
plaint was filed on December 11, 1997 and the hearing before the Commission oc-
curred on February 25, 1998.
17. Stephen Franklin, Prisoners of Fate, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1999, at C17 (de-
scribing the plight of one of the prisoners, Jennifer Davis). "She went 20 months
before she was formally charged." Id. "A month later in March 1998, she sat
through a week long trial and was given a six-year prison term." Id. "This meant
that she could have gone free as early as September of 1998 because Peruvian law
would have allowed her to go free after serving one third of her prison time." Id.
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March 11, 1998, within thirty days, they and their Peruvian co-
defendants were finally tried, convicted, and sentenced.'x
On July 16, 1998, however, the Supreme Court of Peru, without
any explanation, reversed the convictions and sentences and re-
manded their case for renewed investigation and a new trial.'" Their
Peruvian co-defendants, who received maximum sentences of fifteen
and twenty years, took the appeal.20 Under Peru procedures, the case
went directly to the Peruvian Supreme Court.2' Since Peru, a civil
law country, does not permit defendants to move for severance or to
waive their right to appeal,2' Davis and Barnes were involuntarily
joined as parties to that appeal. Finally, on May 31, 1999, Davis and
Barnes were once again charged, tried, and convicted. Each received
a sentence of six years. This time the Peruvian co-defendants, satis-
fied with their sentences, did not appeal. Davis and Barnes were re-
leased from prison on parole on July 27, 1999 and returned to the
United States on November 23, 1999. They are serving their parole
in the United States until September 24, 2002.
Making their plight all the more insufferable was the knowledge
that a bilateral prisoner transfer treaty exists between the United
States and Peru that would have allowed them to serve their sen-
tences in the United States. 2 The transfer treaty would have placed
them in their country, which enforces standards of sanitation, health,
and security. This bilateral prisoner transfer treaty is one of several
treaties in which the United States has entered since 1976.4 President
18. See id. (discussing that since one of the three Peruvians convicted in the
drug scheme had his conviction overturned and the cases were linked together,
Barnes and Davis had to be retried with the other Peruvians).
19. See id.
20. See id. (mentioning that the Peruvians' attorney claimed that Barnes and
Davis received much lower sentences because of pressure from the United States).
This is compared to Lourdes Villanueva's 15-year sentence and Miguel Barandi-
aran's and Gianino de Vettori's 20-year sentences. Id.
21. See id.
22. See 143 CONG. REC. H3686 (daily ed. June 11, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Ewing).
23. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences. July 6, 1979, U.S.-Peru,
32 U.S.T. 1471.
24. See Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Jan. 25, 1983, U.S.-
Fr., T.I.A.S. No. 10823; Treaty on Cooperation in the Execution of Penal Sen-
2000] 1075
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Jimmy Carter negotiated the first of these with Mexico after the State
Department had received numerous reports of mistreatment of
American citizens incarcerated there and of inadequate judicial pro-
cedures and remedies under the Mexican legal system.2" These pris-
oner transfer treaties allow citizens of a signatory country who are
convicted and sentenced by the other signatory country to serve their
sentences in the country of their citizenship.1
6
Before a prisoner may petition for transfer under such a treaty,
however, the country in which he or she is detained must impose a
final sentence upon the prisoner.2 7 This means that all appeals must
be exhausted and all fines and costs paid.28 Foreign nationals of a
party to one of these bilateral treaties with the United States who are
incarcerated in the United States can fulfill this prerequisite to a
transfer easily by waiving their right to appeal. United States citi-
zens, incarcerated in a civil law country such as Peru, do not simi-
larly control their own eligibility for transfer under the treaty. Under
many civil law systems, the state prosecutor has an automatic appeal
by right.29 Moreover, in Peru, all co-defendants are automatically
joined in an appeal by any one of them, and thus one defendant may
drag others on his or her appeal of right.3° The United States Con-
gress was aware of this potential discrepancy when it enacted the
implementation legislation for these treaties, but in the interest of
tences, Oct. 29, 1982, U.S.-Thail., T.I.A.S; Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal
Judgments, June 7, 1979, U.S.-Turk., 32 U.S.T. 3187; Treaty on the Execution of
Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, U.S.-Pan., 32 U.S.T. 1565; Treaty on the Execu-
tion of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, U.S.-Bol., 30 U.S.T. 796; Treaty on the
Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T. 6263; Treaty on
the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex., 28 U.S.T. 7399.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, 1, 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3146, 3146.
26. See id. at 28.
27. See id. at 29-30.
28. See id.
29. See MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUCE A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE, CRIMINAL: PRISONER TRANSFER, at sec. 14-3-1(3) (Supp. 1997)
(stating that a U.S. offender abroad may be prevented from transferring to the
United States).
30. See 143 CONG. REC. H3686 (daily ed. June I1, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Ewing).
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protecting the other signatory country's sovereignty, the United
States could not prevent such a disparity in the treatment of United
States citizens detained abroad." Congress did not, however, antici-
pate that a signatory country would violate international standards of
due process to firther thwart a prisoner's eligibility for transfer under
one of these treaties.
The dilemma of Davis and Barnes was precisely the problem that
Congress had sought to prevent with the transfer treaties.'2 Unfortu-
nately, Congress did not foresee that, without the possibility of sev-
erance from co-defendants and/or waiver of their appellate rights, the
final sentence requirement would produce a trap for United States
citizens such as Davis and Barnes. The purpose of the treaties is to
rescue prisoners from extreme harsh confinement that violates mini-
mum standards for security, health, and well-being. Tragically, an of-
fending country can easily compound the problem of inhumane in-
carceration by refusing to enter a final judgment against the prisoner,
which in turn, makes the prisoner ineligible for transfer to her own
country of citizenship.
As this Essay details, however, there are ways out of this trap.
First, the United States Congress can amend the implementation leg-
islation and instruct the Administration to renegotiate prisoner trans-
fer treaties to prevent the final sentence requirement from becoming
a device that frustrates the purposes of such treaties. Second, the In-
ter-American Human Rights Commission and Court of the Organi-
zation of American States should exercise jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of member states' bilateral prison transfer treaty where the in-
tent of the treaty is thwarted by a signatory member's continuous and
flagrant violation of international human rights standards.
To understand why one or both of these means must be realized,
Part I describes the motivation of the United States in negotiating
prisoner transfer treaties, the goals it hoped to achieve through them,
and the requirements it imposed on prisoners hoping to secure their
transfer under them, including the problematic final sentence prereq-
31. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 29-30 (1977). reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3152.
32. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that the United States House of Representatives
resolved that prisoner transfer treaties were needed to address Mexico's harsh
punishment of Americans arrested there for minor drug offenses).
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uisite. Part II of this Essay explains why the final sentence prerequi-
site actually allows signatory member states such as Peru to defeat
the purpose and goals in executing prisoner transfer treaties. Part III
proposes that the United States amend its transfer of prisoners trea-
ties and implement legislation to eliminate or qualify the final sen-
tence requirement. Finally, Part III argues that international human
rights bodies such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
and Court exercise jurisdiction to enforce a bilateral prisoner transfer
treaty where the member state of incarceration has failed to comply
with its obligation to enforce standards of due process for the incar-
cerated persons and to provide a safe and healthy prison environment
for them. Only by seizing these means of breaking the trap that
United States citizens like Davis and Bames find themselves in, will
the spirit and purpose of the prisoner transfer treaties be fulfilled.
I. WHY PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES AND
WHAT THEY REQUIRE
The United States currently has formal bilateral prisoner transfer
treaties with Bolivia,33 Canada,34 France," Mexico,36 Panama," Peru,'
Thailand,39 and Turkey, 40 for the transfer of prisoners. 4 ' Further, the
33. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, U.S.-BoI.,
30 U.S.T. 796.
34. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, U.S.-Can.,
30 U.S.T. 6263.
35. See Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Jan. 25, 1983, U.S.-
Fr., T.I.A.S. No. 10,823.
36. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex.,
28 U.S.T. 7399.
37. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, U.S.-Pan.,
32 U.S.T. 1565.
38. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, U.S.-Peru,
32 U.S.T. 1471.
39. See Treaty on Cooperation in the Execution of Penal Sentences, Oct. 29,
1982, U.S.-Thail., T.I.A.S.
40. See Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, June 7, 1979, U.S.-
Turk., 32 U.S.T. 3187.
41. See Maureen T. Walsh & Bruce Zagaris, The United States-Mexico Treati,
on the Execution of Penal Sanctions: The Case for Reevaluating the Treaty and Its
Policies in View of the NAFTA and Other Developments, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
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United States is party to a multilateral prisoner transfer treaty with
the Council of Europe42 and a signatory to the Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons of the Organization of American
States.4 ' These treaties all share similar objectives and requirements.
They all also share a common impetus.
As Section A of this Part explains, Congress urged the President to
negotiate these treaties in response to complaints by United States
citizens who were imprisoned abroad under inhumane treatment and
denied adequate judicial protection in foreign countries, especially
Mexico. In implementing the terms of the treaty with Mexico, how-
ever, Congress realized that there are other objectives that prisoner
transfer treaties serve even where prison conditions and observance
of due process in the country of incarceration comport with interna-
tional standards. Section B describes these expanded rationales for
prisoner transfer treaties. The implementation legislation also sets
forth the basic requirements for transfer. Section C lists these prereq-
uisites that, with a few minor alterations, each of the transfer treaties
reiterates.
A. THE IMPETUS FOR PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
Twenty-one years before Peruvian officials apprehended Davis
and Barnes, threw them into an overcrowded prison that was incapa-
385, 390 (1995) (tracing the development of the United States-Mexico treaty and
listing subsequent prisoner transfer agreements the United States has entered);
ABBELL & RIsTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-1-1 (listing countries with which the
United States has prisoner transfer agreements). In addition to the formal transfer
treaties to which the United States is party, it has informal agreements with the
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Id. See generally, Liana
E. Olivarez, The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treat': Current Problems
and Solutions, TEX. INT'L L.J. 395, 395 (1995) (discussing the prisoner transfer
treaty with Mexico and its shortcomings); Mark Andrew Sherman, Transfer of
Prisoners Under International Instruments and Domestic Legislation: A Com-
parative Study, 28 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. & ECON. 495, 495 (1995) (asserting that
due to increased transnational communication, imprisonment of foreigners will be-
come increasingly important).
42. Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar.
21, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10,824.
43. Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, done
June 7, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No 104-35 (1993). The United States signed the
convention on January 19, 1995 but the Senate has not yet ratified it. See Walsh &
Zagaris, supra note 41, at 426 n.201.
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ble of providing their basic human necessities, and left them to lan-
guish there uncharged and untried initially for more than a year and a
half, the United States State Department fielded similar complaints
from family members of Americans incarcerated in Mexico." These
complaints alleged due process violations, specifically "that Ameri-
cans were being arrested, interrogated, and imprisoned for relatively
minor offenses, especially drug offenses,""' and reported horrible
prison conditions "with respect to food, medical treatment, security
against violence, and other matters." 6
Although in early 1975, the State Department attempted to address
these complaints, 7 its efforts fell short.48 Diplomacy could not even
guarantee prompt notice to the consular offices of a United States
44. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146 (reporting that the State Department fielded complaints from family members
of United States citizens, many young, incarcerated in Mexico that alleged dispro-
portionate sentences for the offense charged and mistreatment in the prisons); see
also Olivarez, supra note 41, at 396 (describing the conditions in Mexican pris-
ons); Harvard Law Review Assoc., Constitutional Problems in the Execution of
Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1500, 1500 (1977) (discussing the agreement between Mexico and
the United States, as well as the political and constitutional issues implicated by
the agreement); Becky Churchill Clark, Elimination of the Prisoner Consent Re-
quirenent in the Mexico-United States Prisoner Transfer Treaty: Bandaid or Cure
for the Rise in Alien Criminals?, 5 S.W. J.L. & TRADE AM. 231, 234-35 (1998)
(reporting that widespread evidence of torture, inadequate counsel, coerced con fes-
sions, and substandard living conditions led to the agreement).
45. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146. See generally, ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-1-2 (noting that
families have been one of the motivating factors in the prisoner transfer agree-
ments).
46. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3176 (Statement of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary, Department of State).
The families complained that many times only bribes to jail officials would allevi-
ate the inhumane conditions that their loved ones endured in these jails. See id. at
3146. See also Abraham Abramovsky & Steven J. Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of
the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 275,
286 (1979) (noting that the State Department viewed the humanitarian interest of
the treaty as paramount).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146 (noting that the State Department attempted to improve the living conditions
of Americans in Mexican prisons).
48. See id. (characterizing the State Department's efforts as "inadequate").
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citizen's arrest. 9 The United States House of Representatives inter-
vened in April of 1975.' After several hearings that substantiated
complaints, the Committee on International Relations recommended
a bilateral prisoner transfer treaty.5' By early 1977, the Carter ad-
ministration negotiated and signed bilateral agreements with Mexico
and Canada." The United States Senate ratified both treaties in Sep-
tember of 1977."3
The Transfer of Offender To or From Foreign Countries Act " im-
plemented the prisoner transfer treaties with Mexico and Canada and
became the impetus for other bilateral treaties. In the only report on
the Act, Congress made it clear that the treaty with Mexico "was
considered to be a precedent for other treaties with other countries so
as to allow Americans in foreign jails to serve their time in American
prisons."55 By framing the intent in this manner, Congress hoped to
encourage bilateral agreements with other countries irrespective of
any complaints of due process violations or prison conditions. Nev-
ertheless, the treaties and the Act would not have been possible but
for Congress' "particular concern [with] conditions of Americans,
particularly younger Americans, in Mexican jails, serving relatively
49. See id. at 3146-47 (reporting great delays before Mexican authorities noti-
fied consular offices of incarcerated Americans).
50. See id. (noting the House of Representatives responded to these complaints
by holding hearings before the Subcommittee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives). The testimony from these hearings substantiated the
complaints that had been made about foreign prisons, particularly the ones in
Mexico. See id.
51. See id (noting that the Committee considered several options and deter-
mined a treaty would be an effective way of addressing these problems).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146-47 (noting that at the time of the hearings there were approximately 600
American prisoners in Mexican jails and 275 in Canadian jails). A significant
number of the prisoners became eligible for transfer under the provisions in the
treaty immediately upon enactment. Id.
53. See id. at 3148.
54. 18 U.S.C. secs. 4100-15 (1998).
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long terms for some drug offenses."57
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
If complaints rising to the level of those charged against the penal
system of Mexico were needed to justify a prisoner transfer treaty,
then the prisoner transfer treaty between the United States and Can-
ada would have been groundless. As the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives noted at the time it reported on the legisla-
tion implementing the treaties with Mexico and Canada, "there have
not been any complaints about the treatment of Americans in Cana-
dian jails, [yet] a treaty with Canada for the transfer of prisoners has
also been signed."58 Congress envisioned benefits of transfer beyond
relieving United States citizens imprisoned in Mexico from the con-
ditions described in the complaints to the State Department in 1975.
First, Congress believed that transfer would foster rehabilitation of
the prisoner. 9 Congress noted that a prisoner's country of citizenship
is a more familiar and a less hostile environment. ' In his or her home
country, a prisoner is closer to family and friends who can more eas-
ily visit the prisoner and keep him or her connected to the commu-
nity outside the prison walls.6' In a foreign country, a prisoner often
57. Id.; see also David S. Finkelstein, Note, "Ever Been in a [Foreign]
Prison?" The hnplementation of Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties by U.S.
States, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 131-32 (1997) (book review) (noting the Mexi-
can-American treaty addresses the United States' concerns for its citizens living in
sub-par prison conditions and that the United States benefits from transfer treaties
because it improves the chances of rehabilitation). But see Walsh & Zagaris, supra
note 41, at 392-93 (alleging that traditional justifications for prisoner transfer
agreements such as rehabilitation, improved relations, and humanitarianism are
pretextual, and that the true reason for the agreements is to combat mistreatment of
Americans incarcerated in foreign prisons, specifically in Mexican prisons).
58. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146.
59. See id. at 3149 (mentioning rehabilitation as a primary objective of the
United States penal policy).
60. See id. (stating that an unfamiliar and hostile environment impedes reha-
bilitation).
61. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 39; Finkelstein, supra note 57, at
127 (discussing the primary benefits of prison transfer treaties). "Furthermore,
transferring a prisoner to his home country is likely to improve the prisoner's so-
cial rehabilitation by enabling the prisoner to benefit from easier access to family,
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confronts language and cultural barriers making clear communica-
tion with his or her jailers and other inmates difficult or impossible. 2
A foreign prison might restrict the prisoner's observance of his or her
cultural and religious customs. 3 In some cases, the foreign prisoner
might encounter outright prejudice against foreigners. ' Therefore,
Congress concluded that the prisoner and the society to which he or
she returns after incarceration would benefit from the advantages of
successful prisoner rehabilitation offered by a transfer.
Second, Congress trusted that such transfers would improve rela-
tions between signatory countries." Originally, Congress foresaw a
situation, much like the one that Davis and Barnes endured, where
United States citizens would be incarcerated in a country that does
not place its penal system "high on the list of legislative priorities. " '
A case such as Davis' and Barnes' may cause strain between the
United States and the country that imprisoned the Americans. To-
day, this strain is also felt in the United States by several American
states that house tens of thousands of foreign prisoners in state-
funded prisons.68 Transferring the prisoner to his or her country of
citizenship to serve his or her sentence would relieve these diplo-
matic strains.
Finally, Congress recognized that imprisonment in a foreign
friends, and counsel, as well as better and faster employment opportunities upon
release." Id.
62. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 391 (discussing the difficulties of
serving criminal sentences abroad).
63. See id. (enumerating this as a hardship of foreign incarceration).
64. See id. (noting this is a hardship of foreign incarceration).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3149 (noting that incarceration of foreigners strains relations with the offender's
home country).
66. Id.
67. See 143 CONG. REC. at H7715-16 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Ewing) (advising the House of Representatives that Peru's Ambassador to the
United States had rebuffed an invitation to discuss Davis' and Barnes's case with
several Representatives demonstrating that "Ambassador Luna could not care less
about the U.S. Congress").
68. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 387-88 (reporting that both Florida
and California, for example, have taken measures to eliminate foreign prisoners
from their penal systems and to recoup the costs of detaining such prisoners from
the federal government).
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country creates "special hardships" for a prisoner, such as an inabil-
ity to maintain contact with family and friends and language barriers
that add to the already "severe" punishment of incarceration. 9 One
commentator illustrated the effect of these "special hardships" by ar-
guing that a United States prisoner "who does not speak the language
of the sentencing country is essentially in solitary confinement in that
country's prisons even though such a penalty is not typically im-
posed on others for the same crime."70 Congress considered these
"special hardships" so severe that it labeled the prevention of them as
a "human rights" imperative and "[t]he most fundamental justifica-
tion" for the prisoner transfer •ets
C. THE PREREQUISITES TO TRANSFER
The Act that implemented the treaties with Mexico and Canada
and facilitated the enactment of subsequent agreements provides that
a treaty must exist between the United States and the detaining
country before a prisoner transfer can take place.72 Within that treaty,
the signatory countries may impose any conditions upon transfer that
they negotiate. 3 Nevertheless, the Act conditions all transfers under
such treaties on satisfaction of several prerequisites .
69. H.R. REP. No. 95-720 at 26, 53 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3149, 3176.
70. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 391, citing Gregory Gelfand, Inter-
national Penal Transfer Treaties: The Case for an Unrestricted Multilateral
Transfer Treatj,, 64 B.U. L. REv. 563, 585 (1984) (explaining special hardships
experienced by foreign prisoners that are not experienced by other prisoners native
to the country of incarceration convicted of the same crime).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3149 (noting that while incarceration in one's own country is severe, imprisonment
in a foreign country creates special hardships).
72. See The Transfer To or From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. sec.
4100(a) (1998) (requiring a treaty to exist before the provisions of the Act apply);
see also ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-2-2(1) (discussing the treaty
requirement imposed by the Act).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 27-28 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3150 (asserting that the Act was designed to accommodate differ-
ences in various prison transfer agreements).
74. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 4100(b) (listing several requirements for transfer under
any of the applicable transfer treaties).
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1. Citizenship or Nationality
A prisoner must be a citizen or national of the country to which he
or she requests transfer.75 Thus, the United States will not approve
transfers of resident aliens to the United States nor will it transfer a
prisoner to any country other than his or her country of citizenship or
nationality.76 This requirement mirrors the terms of the treaties with
Canada and Mexico. The House Committee on the Judiciary con-
sidered broadening the scope of future treaties to include resident ali-
ens and domiciliaries of the country to which transfer is requested.'
It rejected doing so until the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizen-
ship, and International Law had an opportunity to weigh the advan-
tages and disadvantages of including resident aliens within the scope
of transfer treaties.79 The Subcommittee, however, never took up the
75. See id. (imposing a citizenship requirement on prisoners seeking to trans-
fer).
76. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 398-99 (discussing the nationality
requirement). Ms. Walsh and Mr. Zagaris, who focus primarily upon the benefits
of prisoner transfer treaties to the cost and burden of housing foreign prisoners in
United States prisons, note that the United States does make exceptions to the citi-
zenship or nationality requirement. See id. at 399. Where a foreign prisoner incar-
cerated in a United States prison requests transfer to his or her country of citizen-
ship or nationality, but has significant ties with the United States such as family,
the United States will "view [the request] with suspicion." See hiL Transfer away
from family and friends contravenes one of the most important goals of the transfer
treaties: fostering rehabilitation by allowing the prisoner more accessibility to
loved ones. See id. The treaty between the United States and Mexico explicitly in-
corporates this rationale by prohibiting transfer from a country that the prisoner is
a domiciliary. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-
Mex., art. II see. (3), 28 U.S.T. 7399. Even where the governing treaty omits this
prohibition, United States authorities will reject transfer requests by United States
domiciliaries or resident aliens for transfer from the United States on these
grounds. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 399.
77. Compare Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, U.S.-
Can., art. II see. (b), 30 U.S.T. 6263 and Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sen-
tences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex., art. 1I sec. (2), 28 U.S.T. 7399 with The Transfer
To and From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 4100(b). See also H.R. REP.
No. 95-720, at 28 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3150 (explaining that
the Act extricates the citizenship or nationality requirement from the treaties with
Canada and Mexico).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 28 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3150; Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 398-99.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 28 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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issue, and thus citizenship or nationality remains a prerequisite to
transfer under any of the treaties.0
2. Double Criminality
The Act permits a prisoner to "be transferred to or from the United
States... only if the offense for which the offender was sentenced
satisfies the requirement of double criminality. .."" "Double crimi-
nality" means that both the country from which the prisoner seeks
transfer and the country to which the prisoner seeks transfer regard
the act that the prisoner committed as criminal." The House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary included this prerequisite to prevent the
United States from an untenable position of enforcing a sentence that
might be abhorrent to United States law.83 The Committee offered as
an example a country that would punish a prisoner for attending re-
ligious services on a day other than that prescribed by its law. 4 The
Committee hypothesized that the United States would not enforce
such a sentence," presumably because it would offend the First
Amendment's freedom of religion clause.16 Similarly, neither the
United States nor any individual state presumably would want to en-
trust the execution of a sentence it imposed to a country that does not
consider the underlying conduct to be criminal.87 The transfer treaties
3150.
80. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-2-2(2) (noting that a crimi-
nal conviction would strip most permanent resident aliens of their entitlement to
reenter the United States despite Congress' failure to consider the matter).
81. The Transfer To or From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 4100(b)
(1998).
82. Id. sec. 4101(a).
83. See H.R. NO. 95-720, at 30 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3152. But see id. at 53 (prepared statement of Warren Christopher) ("It is essential
to remember the context of the treaties and this legislation. Most Americans
probably have never had reason to consider how exceedingly fortunate we are to
have excellent relations with our two neighbors").
84. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 30 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3152.
85. See id.
86. See U.S CONST. amend. I.
87. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-2-2(3) (using example of
outlawed religious services to explain "double criminality").
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are intended to ameliorate the extraordinary circumstances attendant
to serving a penal sentence in a foreign country, not to ameliorate the
sentence itself imposed by a duly authorized court of law.
Furthermore, the "double criminality" prerequisite requires that
the country from which the prisoner seeks transfer still considers the
conduct criminal at the time of transfer.8 The House Committee on
the Judiciary explained that many countries would not fully execute a
sentence imposed under a law that is later repealed." This require-
ment attempts to prevent conflicts that would arise if the United
States were to execute a sentence imposed by a foreign country that
that country would not itself continue to execute."
3. Prisoner's Consent
Under the Act, "an offender may be transferred to or from the
United States only with the offender's consent.. ."' This consent
must be "knowingly and voluntarily" given at the time of the actual
transfer. 92 Minors and prisoners found mentally incompetent by a
verifying officer may consent to a transfer only with the help of a
parent, a guardian, a guardian ad litem, or "an appropriate court of
the sentencing country."'93
Some commentators have called the consent prerequisite "the re-
quirement of central importance to the prisoner transfer process...
.,,9 They point to the fact that only this prerequisite may be chal-
lenged by the prisoner in the country to which he or she is transferred
after the transfer has been completed. 9' The House Committee on the
88. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 4101(a).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 30 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3152; Abbell & Ristau, supra note 29 at sec. 14-2-2(3) (stating that crime must still
be an offense at the time of transfer to accommodate laws of countries such as
Mexico, that permit prisoners repeal rights).
90. See id.




94. ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, at sec. 14-2-2(5).
95. See id.
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Judiciary stressed that it did not want to create a policy of involun-
tary transfers.96
The Committee also feared that prisoners might attempt to revoke
their consent to transfer once the transfer had been completed,97 per-
haps in an effort to avoid serving a sentence at all. United States
courts acknowledged the concept of revocable consent in Fourth
Amendment search cases and Fifth Amendment custodial interroga-
tion cases.9" The Committee foresaw an extension of this concept and
sought to prevent it." It did so by making a prisoner's consent ir-
revocable upon actual and physical transfer and a determination of
competency by a verifying officer in the country to which the pris-
oner will be transferred.'°° Prior to actual, physical transfer, however,
the prisoner remains free to revoke his or her consent.'°0
4. Finality of Judgment and Sentence
The last prerequisite to transfer under any of the prisoner transfer
treaties and the legislation that implemented them is that the prisoner
has the benefit of a final judgment, namely a conviction and sen-
tence.' °2 This means that "[a]n offender shall not be transferred to or
from the United States if a proceeding by way of appeal or of collat-
eral attack upon the conviction or sentence is pending."'0 3 The trea-
ties with Canada and Mexico, both countries in which the prosecutor
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-720, at 29 (1997), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3151.
97. See id. ("The treaties authorize the receiving State, if it so desires, to verify
that the offender's consent to the transfer is given voluntarily and with full knowl-
edge of the consequences thereof.").
98. See id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV & V.
99. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 29 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3151 (making consent irrevocable should avoid future legal problems similar to
those raised by the search and questioning cases); Harvard Law Review Assoc.,




102. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 29-30 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3146, 3152.
103. The Transfer To or From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 4100(c)
(1998).
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has a right of appeal, require a showing that the time for that appeal
has expired regardless of whether an appeal was actually filed." The
House Committee on the Judiciary did not foresee any difficulty with
this requirement because the time for appeal in both Canada and
Mexico is relatively brief and the prisoner and prosecutor could
waive their respective right of appeal.' : Nevertheless, the other trans-
fer treaties and the Act do not require the time for appeal to expire,
only that there be no appeals actually pending."* As the next Part
details, however, even this concession has led to a trap. When a
country fails to observe international standards of due process, the
finality of judgment and sentence prerequisite effectively become a
bar to transfer and negates the treaty's objectives.
IL. THE TRAP CAUSED BY A SIGNATORY
COUNTRY'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS
The impetus for the first prisoner transfer treaty between the
United States and Mexico was the onslaught of complaints received
by the United States Department of State regarding the plight of
American citizens imprisoned in Mexico for drug offenses. "" These
complaints alleged horrible prison conditions and due process viola-
tions. In addition, Congress and the State Department recognized
that imprisonment in a foreign country created "special hardships" in
addition to the already "severe" punishment of incarceration."
After the United States negotiated other prisoner transfer treaties
modeled after the treaty with Mexico, the stated purpose of prisoner
104. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 29-30 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3152.
105. See id.
106. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-2-2(4). See generally
Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 46, at 284 (critiquing finality of appeals compo-
nent as inducing prisoners to forego appeals).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146.
108. See id. at I & 53.
109. Id. at 26 & 53.
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transfer treaties became rehabilitation.' 0 This apparently reflects
compromises and deal-making. Most likely, rehabilitation proved to
be a goal that would apply equally to foreign prisoners in United
States custody and American citizens imprisoned in foreign prisons.
Consequently, rehabilitation would act as an inducement for the for-
eign country and would deflect from the United States' criticism of
that country's justice and penal systems. Nevertheless, the legislative
history of the Act leading to these treaties makes it clear that the im-
mediate goal of the United States was to rescue American citizens
from the inhumane treatment and injustice described by prisoners in-
carcerated in Mexico in the late 1970s.111
The situation in Peru is equally dire. There is still a prisoner trans-
fer treaty between the United States and Peru. 1'2 However, it has
failed to fulfill its initial purpose to relieve U.S. citizens imprisoned
abroad of these conditions. The House Committee on the Judiciary
apparently did not foresee the deplorable situation in which Davis,
Barnes, and other Americans found themselves in the Republic of
Peru. Congress did not address the situation where a signatory coun-
try to one of these prisoner transfer treaties completely disregards
international norms of due process. The failure to formally charge
and try a prisoner in a timely manner, and refusal to impose a final
judgment and sentence upon her for an excessively long period of
time, are violations of the international norms of due process.
The Committee's inability to predict such a situation is under-
standable given the current clarity of international standards of due
process. Each standard mandates that a criminal detainee be provided
110. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, U.S.-Peru,
Preamble, 32 U.S.T. 1471, 1473 (asserting that the United States and the Republic
of Peru "resolve to enter into a Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences in the
following terms" to "facilitate the social rehabilitation of prisoners" but omitting
any reference to diplomatic and humanitarian goals asserted by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in support of the Act implementing the treaty).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146 ("In the beginning of 1975, a series of complaints were forwarded to the
State Department about the treatment of Americans jailed in Mexican and other
prisons."). The complaints claimed that Americans were being arrested, interro-
gated, and imprisoned for minor offenses and these Americans were being mis-
treated after their arrests. See id.
112. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, U.S.-Peru,
32 U.S.T. 1471.
1090 [15:1071
BILATERAL PRISONER TRANSFER TRE..i T
a speedy notice of the charges against her and a hearing before a
court of law to determine whether her detention is lawful; otherwise
the detainee has the right to be immediately released. Article 10 of
the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that "[e]veryone is entitled... to a fair and public hearing by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal, in the determination.., of any
criminal charge against him.""' 3 The United Nations' Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights establishes more specific due process guar-
antees for criminal detainees in Article 9. It mandates that "[a]nyone
who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against
him." 4 Article 9 further requires that "[a]nyone arrested or detained
on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer.., and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release."" 5 Under United Nations instruments, due process de-
mands that "[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or de-
tention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his de-
tention and order his release if detention is not lawful."""
Regional international instruments specify minimum standards of
due process with similar clarity. For example, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, promulgated by the Organization of
American States ("OAS"), mirrors the guarantees of prompt notice of
charges and a speedy trial embodied in the United Nations instru-
ments.1 7 In addition, it ensures that "[e]very person has the right to a
113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217(111)A, Art. 10,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810 1948.
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1,
OEA/Ser. L.N/I1.23 doc. rev. 2 (1969), entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 7.4-5
(decreeing that a detained or arrested person's right to personal liberty includes the
right to "be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him" and to "be
brought promptly before a judge ... and to trial within a reasonable time or to be
released...").
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hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time .... ."'
The OAS American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
further pronounces that "[e]very individual who has been deprived of
his liberty has the right to have the legality of his detention ascer-
tained without delay by a court, and the right to be tried without un-
due delay, or, otherwise, to be released."'
1 9
Given the uniformity and clarity of these minimum international
standards of due process, perhaps the United States House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary could not imagine a situation that involves a sig-
natory country failing to expeditiously charge and try a foreign pris-
oner for two years or longer. Nor did it foresee that a signatory
country would not finalize a judgment and sentence against the pris-
oner years later.
Nevertheless, the finality of judgment rule defeats the very pur-
pose of a transfer treaty. It allows, in effect, a signatory country to
evade its obligation under the transfer treaty by withholding from a
prisoner prompt notice of charges against her, a speedy and fair trial,
and sentencing. The probability of rehabilitation of the prisoner un-
der such circumstances does not increase."2° Bilateral relations be-
tween the country detaining the prisoner and the country of her citi-
zenship become strained.'2' The prisoner continues to suffer the
"special hardships" attendant to serving in the penal system of a for-
eign country.'22 Ultimately, the very goals of prisoner transfer treaties
118. Id. art. 8.
119. Anerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. res. XXX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota (1948),
OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev.(1965), art. XXV.
120. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146, 3149 (explaining that the implementation legislation and treaties are needed
in part to increase the probability of rehabilitation).
121. See id. (explaining that the treaties and implementation legislation are
needed in part to improve bilateral relations between the signatory countries). Cf
143 CONG. REC. H7715 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ewing) (de-
nouncing the Republic of Peru for its treatment of Davis and Barnes and the Peru-
vian Ambassador to the United States for his apathy toward the situation on the
floor of the United States House of Representatives).
122. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3150 (explaining that "[t]he most fundamental justification" for the treaties and
implementation legislation is a humanitarian one). Another benefit would also be
the improvement of the administration of criminal justice. See id.
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as seen by the House Committee on the Judiciary would be defeated.
Moreover, the most pressing concern of the United States remains
unrealized. Congress took up the issue of prisoner transfer treaties to
redress the problems of American citizens who languish in foreign
prisons without meaningful judicial process in the country of incar-
ceration.2 2 Every day that a United States citizen remains ineligible
for transfer under one of these treaties, the problem persists. The
irony is that what Congress had intended to redress in these treaties,
namely inadequate judicial protection in the country of incarceration,
has become the means by which such treaties are nullified by opera-
tion of the finality of judgment and sentence requirement.
The United States should not tolerate this absurd result. Congress
intended the finality of judgment and sentence requirement to ac-
knowledge and respect the domestic laws and jurisdiction of a sig-
natory country." Congress deemed it necessary to reinforce the ex-
clusivity of a signatory country's sovereignty for several reasons.
The first and most immediate reason was to entice other countries to
enter into similar agreements.'2 6 Congress wanted to foster prisoner
transfer treaties, but the State and Justice Departments advised:
That neither the United States nor any other country which is currently a
party or expected to become a party to a treaty for the execution of penal
sentences would have acquiesced to a provision which would permit the
courts of the [r]eceiving [s]tate to set aside or modify a sentence imposed
by the courts of the [t]ransferring [s]tate... [because] fundamental sover-
eignty of a nation over crimes committed within its territorial boundaries
would be impugned.'"
123. See id. at 1-2 (expressing concern for the conditions of Americans in Mexi-
can jails, particularly younger Americans, serving relatively long terms for some
drug offenses).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 25 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3149 (deciding that finality was necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial
process in other countries).
125. See id. at 41-42 (stating that certain types of challenges to foreign convic-
tions or sentences may not be brought in American courts).
126. See id. (noting the Department of Justice's and Department of State's re-
fusal to suggest provisions that would impugn the fundamental sovereignty of a
nation over crimes committed within its territorial boundaries).
127. Id.
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That reason may no longer be valid in a world that thrives on in-
ternationalism. As some commentators recently noted, global eco-
nomic harmonization is leading to criminal justice harmonization by
necessity."' Thus, the desire to maintain the "fundamental sover-
eignty" of any one nation is no longer as fundamental as it was in
1977.
Moreover, in upholding the exclusive jurisdiction of a signatory
country to a transfer treaty, Congress "assum[ed] that adequate alter-
native procedures [would be] available in the [transferring] state for
challenges" to the transferring state's jurisdiction. 9 Perhaps Con-
gress similarly assumed that adequate alternative procedures would
also be available to redress violations of minimum international
standards of due process. "Adequate alternative procedures" may not
exist in some countries, and Davis's and Barnes's case exemplifies
this problem.
Thus, the two primary reasons for requiring the finality of judg-
ment and sentence no longer justify it. The individual sovereignty of
any one country need not be respected where that sovereign inten-
tionally deviates from the letter and spirit of international law. In
turn, such violations of international norms of due process are often
aggravated where the sovereign fails to provide adequate judicial
procedures to redress the violations of international standards of due
process. Under these circumstances, the final judgment rule has be-
come a trap that prevents the transfer treaty's objectives from being
realized. As the next Part proposes, however, there are means of
breaking free of this trap.
128. See Walsh & Zagaris, supra note 41, at 394 ("The United States and Mex-
ico are experiencing dynamic growth of trade and investment."). This globalization
created by free trade facilitates the movement and sharing of goods between states
and also encourages "global crime." Id. That creates an added pressure for the
world community to strengthen criminal cooperation. See id. "Specifically, as two
or more countries increasingly interact economically and in other ways, pressure is
placed on their criminal justice systems either to harmonize or to develop coopera-
tive mechanisms." Id.
129. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 42 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3160.
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III. LONG AND SHORT TERM MEANS OF
BREAKING THE TRAP
The finality of judgment and sentence prerequisite can no longer
find justification. It has become an effective bar to transfer under any
of the transfer treaties. Thus, Congress must eliminate or modify it in
the implementation legislation of prisoner transfer treaties and en-
courage the President to renegotiate it with respect to the individual
treaties. 130
In the interim, however, prisoners already caught in the trap cre-
ated by the existing requirement must have relief. International hu-
man rights tribunals can and should provide this relief. Moreover,
since the majority of bilateral prisoner transfer treaties that the
United States has entered are with countries that are also party to the
OAS, it is appropriate that the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission and Court exercise jurisdiction and enforce provisions of
such bilateral treaties.
Section A of this Part proposes that Congress act to ameliorate the
finality of judgment and sentence prerequisite. Section B proposes
that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court pro-
vide immediate assistance to prisoners caught in the trap that the fi-
nality of sentence requirement has created by enforcing the spirit of
the bilateral prisoner transfer treaties.
A. CONGRESS MUST ELIMINATE OR MODIFY THE FINALITY OF
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE PREREQUISITE
Presently, the requirement of a final judgment and sentence is ex-
plicitly required not only by the implementing legislation but also by
the individual prisoner transfer treaties. The treaties, however, are
not self-executing. 3' Therefore, Congress may modify the terms of
the treaties by modifying the implementing legislation.'" Since the
130. See generally, Olivarez, supra note 41, at 395 (discussing the constitutional
powers given to the President under such treaties).
131. See H.R. REP. No. 95-270, at 25 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3148.
132. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (holding
that "[a] treaty... is in its nature merely promissory in its character, requiring
legislation to carry its stipulations into effect" and that -[s]uch legislation will be
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legislation expressly conditions a transfer on the existence of a
treaty, '33 however, Congress would be best advised to encourage the
President to renegotiate each individual treaty in addition to amend-
ing the implementing legislation.
This proposal has precedent. On September 30, 1996, Congress
passed Public Law 104-208 that advised the President to begin
renegotiating prisoner transfer treaties within 90 days so as to require
transfer of any illegal alien or alien subject to deportation who "is a
national of a country that is party to such a treaty" and "has been
convicted of a criminal offense under Federal or State law."" 4 Con-
gress intended that this provision would "expedite ... transfer[s]" in
part by "eliminat[ing] any requirement of prisoner consent to such a
transfer...
The consent requirement was as integral to the original treaties and
implementation legislation as is the finality of judgment and sentence
requirement. In fact, Congress devoted several hearings in 1976 and
1977 to the consent requirement because it provided a constitutional
means to prohibit collateral attacks on a foreign conviction or sen-
tence in United States courts without having the effect of suspending
the Writ of Habeas Corpus.3 6 By requiring a prisoner to knowingly
and voluntarily consent to a transfer to the United States, the prisoner
is deemed to have waived any constitutional right to collateral relief
of the foreign conviction or sentence. 1 7 Arguably, these same con-
open to future repeal or amendment"). But see Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102, 110 (1933) (holding that "[a self-executing] treaty will not be deemed to have
been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part of
Congress has been clearly advised").
133. See The Transfer To or From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. sec.
4100(a) (1998); ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14-2-2(1).
134. Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, Title III, sec. 330, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-
631.
135. Id.
136. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26-27 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3149. See also ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 29, sec. 14.2.2(5)
(calling the consent requirement the requirement of "central importance").
137. See H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26-27 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3149. See also Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291, 294
(E.D. Wisc. 1980) (dismissing petition attacking Mexican conviction in part be-
cause the prisoner had consented to transfer and therefore waived any right to
challenge the conviction in United States court).
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siderations do not impact Congress' deletion of the consent require-
ment where the prisoner at issue is being transferred from the United
States and is illegally in the country because no constitutional issue
arises.
The final judgment requirement does not implicate the Constitu-
tion either. Thus, Congress can delete or modify a condition of trans-
fer under the prisoner transfer treaty as demonstrated by the 1996
deletion of the consent requirement regarding transfers from the
United States. Congress should delete the final sentence requirement
completely or, at the very least, eliminate it from transfers from
countries that have a public record of violations of minimum inter-
national standards of due process. In a country where the criminal
justice system is corrupt and/or unreasonably derelict in granting for-
eign prisoners speedy charges and trials, and ultimately fails to issue
a final judgment and sentence, the finality requirement contravenes
the intent of the treaty and the implementing legislation allowing
"Americans in foreign jails to serve their time in American pris-
ons. ,13
8
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND
COURT MUST PROVIDE RELIEF IN THE INTERIM BY ENFORCING THE
SPIRIT OF THE PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-
American Human Rights Court comprise the OAS human rights
system.3 9 The American Convention on Human Rights allows
"[o]nly the State Parties and the Commission... to submit a case to
the Court." 0 But an individual may petition the Commission di-
rectly and personally. A foreign prisoner should be able to enforce
the provisions of a bilateral prisoner transfer treaty by allowing her
to submit a transfer request to the Commission when the country of
incarceration unreasonably frustrates her efforts to transfer to her
country of citizenship. In keeping with the Commission's primary
function of defending and promoting respect for human rights, the
138. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3146.
139. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (1969) entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 33.
140. Id. art. 61(1).
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Commission has the ability to gather facts and to negotiate a
"friendly settlement" to the dispute."' 4' The Commission may, how-
ever, "prescribe a period within which the state is to take the meas-
ures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined" if
a friendly settlement cannot be reached or is not complied with.'
42
The Commission may also submit a claim to the Court.' 4' The
Court may order remedy of any violation of the Convention and
award "fair compensation" to an injured party.'44 Further, it may or-
der "provisional measures" be taken by the violating country imme-
diately.' 45 The Court in the exercise of its current jurisdiction should
also empower the Commission to enforce a country's obligation un-
der a bilateral prisoner transfer treaty.
Whether the Commission has jurisdiction to enforce rights under
bilateral agreements on its own is a novel question. The authors as-
sert that the Commission does indeed have the power to enforce a
country's bilateral obligations under a prisoner transfer treaty. Al-
though the American Convention on Human Rights does not grant
the Commission explicit authority to enforce instruments not prom-
ulgated by the OAS, Article 44 of the Convention grants the Com-
mission the authority to review petitions "containing denunciations
or complaints of violation of th[e] Convention by a State Party.'
4
6
Implicitly, such denunciations or complaints could embrace viola-
tions of some bilateral obligations. Both the Convention and the bi-
lateral prisoner transfer treaty between the United States and Peru,
for example, address the rights of foreign prisoners to a just and
speedy trial and sentence. In its power of review, the Commission
may request, and therefore presumably consider, "any pertinent in-
formation ... ,.4 That should also include the review of conduct of
141. FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESs 20 (1996) (describing the origins, functions, and re-
sponsibility of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
142. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, OEA/Ser.
L./V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (1969) entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 51(2).
143. See id. art. 61.
144. Id. art. 63(l).
145. Id. art. 63(2).
146. Id. art. 44.
147. Id. art. 48(I)(e).
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a member state that violates its legal obligations under a bilateral
prisoner transfer treaty.
Alternatively, the Commission should be allowed to submit the
claim to the Court for an advisory opinion." There is no uncertainty
as to the Court's jurisdiction to interpret a member country's obliga-
tions under a bilateral agreement with an OAS member. The Court
has unequivocally stated that it has that authority. " ' Since the "fun-
damental justification" for a prisoner transfer treaty is to uphold hu-
man rights, 50 the Court has jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion
regarding its breach.
The Commission, however, may initially enforce a country's obli-
gation under a bilateral prisoner transfer treaty as well. The finality
of judgment and sentence prerequisite to the transfer treaty may be-
come an obstacle to actual transfer only when the country from
which the prisoner seeks transfer fails to impose a final judgment and
sentence within a reasonable period of time. The Convention man-
dates that signatory countries bring criminal charges promptly and
conduct a fair and speedy trial within a reasonable time.'"' It follows
that when a member country thwarts the goals of a prisoner transfer
treaty by failing to finalize judgment and sentence, the Commission
may, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, fashion a remedy to re-
dress the violation. It can prescribe a short period of time in which
the violating country must finalize the judgment and sentence, and if
the member fails to comply, the Commission should compel the
148. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEAISer. L.N/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (1969) entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 64(1)
(stating that other OAS organs may consult the Court "regarding the interpretation
of this Convention and other treaties...").
149. See "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court
(Art. 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
1/82, Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 1 (1982). The Court unani-
mously concluded, when asked to clarify its jurisdiction, that: "... the advisory
jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised, in general, with regard to any provision
dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any international treaty ap-
plicable in the American States, regardless of whether it be bilateral or multilat-
eral. . ." Id.
150. H.R. REP. No. 95-720, at 26 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146,
3149.
151. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEA/Ser. L.N/1.23 doc. rev. 2 (1969) entered into force July 18, 1978, art. 8(1).
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member to transfer the prisoner to the country of her citizenship." 2
The Convention requires that "[a]ll persons deprived of their lib-
erty ... be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person" and not "be subjected ... to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment." '53 In fashioning an appropriate remedy to
such violations, the Commission may consider transfer under an ex-
isting bilateral treaty as a means of removing the prisoner from the
unreasonable circumstances of her confinement. The Commission
could also consult the Court. Within the Court's advisory jurisdic-
tion, it could interpret the member's obligations under the bilateral
treaty and design a proper remedy.
Either method will lead to a desirable outcome. The prisoner will
become eligible for transfer. The goals of rehabilitation, bilateral co-
operation, humanitarianism, and respect for the rule of law will be
facilitated.
CONCLUSION
The prisoner transfer treaties have well-defined and achievable
goals: increased probability of rehabilitation, improved bilateral re-
lations, and humanitarianism. To effectuate these goals, a prisoner
seeking transfer currently must comply with the finality of judgment
and sentence condition. The finality of judgment and sentence pre-
requisite, however, can prevent a prisoner from becoming eligible for
a transfer. To remedy this disparity between the stated goals of trans-
fer treaties and their requirements, Congress should amend the im-
plementing legislation and advise the President to renegotiate the in-
dividual treaties. In the meantime, the OAS human rights tribunals
must redress violations of international law and regional law regard-
ing a prisoner's right to a speedy charge and a speedy trial by en-
forcing a member country's obligations under a bilateral prison
transfer treaty.
152. See id. art. 51(2) (authorizing the Commission to "prescribe a period within
which the state is to take the measures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the
situation examined").
153. Id. art. 5(2).
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